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Amid talk of the need for a low carbon 'clean energy revolution' to address the challenges of energy 
poverty and climate change, there is growing academic and policy interest in understanding the role of 
key actors that are expected to enable transitions and transformations towards a low carbon economy 
in a 'pro-poor' way. Within the socio-technical transitions literature there has been increased interest 
in 'the state' as the primary actor with the responsibility, authority and capacity to address these issues. 
But understanding the role of the state in energy transformations requires an appreciation of context: 
what is possible given enormous differences in capacity and resources, autonomy and uneven access to 
different energy sources and technologies. Which technologies and energy systems receive support, 
whose energy needs get prioritised and which actors are charged with the responsibility for meeting 
energy needs are a function of very different decision making processes, political systems and political 
economies. Taking the case of support to solar PV in China and Kenya, we develop a political economy 
analysis of state-led energy transformations which seeks to explore how different aspects of statehood 
impact upon the nature and prospects of the sorts of transformations now urgently required of energy 
systems. We do so by examining political economy dynamics in relation to: (i) the organisation of the 
state; (ii) the political nature of the state; and (iii) the state in the global political economy. This raises 
questions about the viability and desirability of generic prescriptions for 'managed transitions' in light 
of such diversity in state forms and functions, the different ways in which they interact with energy 
systems and the evident limits of the sorts of transitions and transformations that states alone can steer, 
manage or impose. It thus speaks to broader debates about the politics of 'care' versus 'control' in 
transformations to sustainability (Stirling 2014, Stirling 2011). 
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1. Introduction 
The Paris Climate Agreement and various other international efforts (for example the Sustainable 
Development Goals) require that several trillion dollars of new funding for climate technology transfer 
to developing countries be mobilised in the next few years. Much of this is framed around what might 
be considered 'transformative' ambitions, for example the United Nation's (UN) aim of providing 
sustainable energy for the 1.2 billion people that currently lack access to electricity by 2030 and the 
aims under the Paris Agreement to avoid more than two degrees of global warming. Across all of this 
there is an implicit assumption that state intervention (whether at international or national levels) can 
somehow manage these transformations in low carbon and pro-poor directions. In this paper we seek 
to contribute to emerging discussions within the socio-technical transitions literature around the 
politics of transitions and, more specifically, the role and nature of the state within these politics. Our 
analysis speaks directly to contemporary critiques of prescriptions for 'managed transitions' (Stirling 
2014; Stirling 2011), with their implicit assumption that a monolithic state-like entity might exist through 
which the prescribed actions necessary for transitions might be put in place, in order to effect some 
form of, '[…] seemingly amorphous, singular, depoliticized "way forward".' (Stirling 2014: 5). These 
assumptions are built into international treaties like the Paris Agreement about the role of states, as 
well many national transition plans, visions and strategies which envisage a top-down process of state-
led energy transformation, one which sits awkwardly with the historical experience to date of the 
practice of energy transitions (Newell 2015). 
In this paper we focus on low carbon energy technologies in relation to the above mentioned 
international policy context (with a specific focus on solar PV), technologies that it is suggested will be 
central to how such transformative changes might be achieved. Policy approaches that have attempted 
such transformative ambitions to date (for example the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)) have tended (and continue) to frame the 
issue as two dimensional, consisting solely of a need for more finance for energy technology hardware. 
This two-dimensional focus has been reflected within scholarly work on energy and international 
development which exhibits a predominance of work from engineering and economics, with very little 
on the socio-cultural or political dimensions of the problem (Watson et al. 2012; Ockwell and Byrne 
2016). This two-dimensional, 'hardware financing', policy approach has met with limited success, 
particularly in low and middle income countries. For example, by 2016 Africa as a whole (including South 
Africa and the countries of North Africa) had received only three per cent of accumulated international 
investment under the CDM. If new international policy efforts and spending are to avoid further 
reinforcement of existing structural inequalities and deliver meaningfully against the need of poor 
countries and poor and marginalised women and men therein, there is an urgent need for more 
sophisticated accounts of how energy transitions can (or cannot) be supported through deliberate 
interventions through public policy. In sum, a gap currently exists between expectations and 
assumptions about the role of the state, technology transfer, and the nature of finance and markets in 
international agreements and policy proscriptions and the ways in which transitions are actually 
unfolding in practice in different parts of the world (Newell and Bulkeley 2016). 
One area of scholarly work which goes beyond the existing two-dimensional perspective on energy 
transitions is the field of socio-technical transitions, a field previously developed through attention 
mostly to post-war European contexts, but one that has begun to be explored through application in 
developing country contexts (Ulsrud et al. 2011; Ulsrud et al. 2015; Tyfield et al. 2015; Ahlborg and 
Sjöstedt 2015; Ockwell and Byrne 2016; Rolffs et al. 2015; Baker et al. 2014; Power et al. 2016; Newell 
and Mulvaney 2013; Newell and Phillips 2016). Whilst a socio-technical transitions perspective brings 
some socio-cultural and evolutionary dimensions of energy transitions to the fore, increasingly there 
2 
have been calls for the field to attend more explicitly to political dimensions of energy transitions (e.g. 
Meadowcroft 2011; Geels 2014; Kern 2011; Scrase and Smith 2009).  
Specific concerns have been raised about the extent to which 'the state' is properly understood and 
accounted for within transitions scholarship (Johnstone and Newell 2016). This includes thinking about 
the state’s role in transitions and transformation (Meadowcroft 2011; Kuzemko et al. 2016; Lockwood 
2014), explored through transition management approaches (Kemp et al, 2007), work on the 
governance of energy transitions (Verbong and Loorbach 2012) and around specific state functions in 
relation to transitions such as the entrepreneurial state (Mazzucato 2013; Mazzucato, 2015) or the use 
of industrial policy (Pegels 2014). But there continues to be a neglect of more systematic and 
comparative thinking about the relationship between different forms of state and statehood and 
different approaches to transition and transformation. This constitutes a broad canvas, from an 
exploration of how types and depth of democracy produce different types of (energy) pathways, for 
example (Johnstone and Stirling 2015), to the role of electoral and party systems and specific policy 
processes and styles of decision making, to different political economies constituted by an array of 
state-society complexes captured in part by the notion of varieties of capitalism (Hall 2001).  
  
3 
2. Aims, Approach and Intended Contributions 
Keeping in mind our focus as outlined in the Introduction, this paper conducts a comparative analysis 
of the politics of transitions around solar PV (including grid-connected, mini-grids, solar home systems 
and solar lanterns) in two contrasting developing country contexts, Kenya and China. It is based on two 
empirical studies that sought to reconstruct a historical political economy account of the emergence of 
solar PV in each of these countries. These are described in more detail below but, in addition, readers 
are encouraged to read the two Working Papers that describe each country study in depth (see Geall et 
al. forthcoming 2017; Byrne and Mbeva 2017).  
In Kenya, our empirical material is based on a re-examination, from a political economy perspective, of 
the detailed innovation history of the Kenyan solar PV market developed by Ockwell and Byrne (2016). 
This innovation history is based on over 100 hours of recorded interview testimony and a stakeholder 
workshop. Our new political analysis of this history makes an important new contribution as, whilst 
Ockwell and Byrne (2016) argue that their approach offers a more systemic and socio-culturally attuned 
understanding of the success of the Kenyan solar PV market than previous analyses, they are also careful 
to acknowledge the weaknesses of their analysis in attending to the politics of sustainable energy 
transitions. This reanalysis of Ockwell and Byrne’s previous empirical material was augmented in the 
current study by nine new stakeholder interviews which focussed on key moments in the history of solar 
PV in Kenya where political economy dynamics were likely to be most evident. By using a political 
economy lens to revisit the empirical material already gathered, combined with the deeper work on key 
moments, a political economy of Kenyan PV niche-building was then reconstructed (see Byrne and 
Mbeva 2017). 
In China, our empirical material focuses on the announcement in 2014 by Chinese national leaders and 
state energy regulators of a new Solar Energy for Poverty Alleviation Programme (SEPAP), an ambitious 
plan to help alleviate rural poverty through deploying distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in 
poor areas. The initiative, which is positioned as an integral component of China’s political campaign to 
eradicate poverty by 2020, aims to provide energy access to the claimed one per cent of the Chinese 
population currently lacking such access. This includes an ambition to add over 10 GW capacity and 
benefit more than two million households from around 35,000 villages across the country by 2020, 
generating additional annual income of over 3,000 RMB for each household, mainly through rooftop 
and small-scale solar systems (Geall et al. forthcoming, 2017).  
In order to examine the political economy dynamics at play here, within the broader context of the 
historical political economy of solar PV in China, our empirical material focuses at two levels (see Geall 
et al. forthcoming, 2017 for more detail). The first is based on detailed policy analysis of SEPAP within 
the broader historical context of Chinese energy and poverty alleviation policies, tracing the emergence 
and implementation of SEPAP in China and assessing its social, political and economic rationales via a 
discourse analytic approach. This was then contrasted with the findings from new fieldwork in Guinan 
County, Qinghai Province, on the Tibetan Plateau in north-western China, one of the more isolated and 
underdeveloped regions of western China. This allowed the research to compare the ambitions and 
claims of SEPAP with the lived energy practices of poor and marginalised people, including traditionally 
nomadic people, in rural areas of China, allowing insights into the ways in which the politics of energy 
and development policy play out between local, regional and national state and non-state actors and 
the extent to which poor and marginalised people do, or do not, benefit as a result. China has received 
a degree of scholarly attention with regards to environmental policy, particularly the establishment of 
new industrial capabilities and installed capacity around low carbon energy technologies (Watson et al. 
2015; Lewis 2013; Lewis 2007; Dai and Xue 2014; Lema and Lema 2013; Urban and Geall 2014) but very 
little to date in terms of critical reflections on the dynamics of the state and statehood in this regard. 
Our analysis, therefore, seeks to contribute towards addressing this gap. 
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Our core aim in this paper is to learn across these two empirical studies to assess what we can discern 
about the significance of different types of state and statehood for the form (direction, inclusiveness, 
tools used) and effectiveness of energy transitions (in meeting pro-poor energy access and low carbon 
objectives). It combines elements, therefore, of the procedural and distributional politics of the state in 
energy transitions.  
Questions of power and political economy run through this enquiry. There are open questions about 
which political economy dynamics are the most important and how best to examine them, which mean 
that in practice an eclectic range of approaches are used to make sense of key moments in state 
decision-making about energy futures. On a spectrum these range from policy process approaches 
(Keeley and Scoones 2003; Keeley and Scoones 2000), to combinations of ideas, institutions and 
interests (Kern 2011; Naess et al. 2015), to versions of political economy which look more at the 
structural and material dimensions of power and link states to broader relations of social power in the 
energy sector (Baker et al.2014; Newell and Phillips 2016). Discourses are examined to see how ideas 
are promoted, discussed, negotiated and contested. Following Leach et al. (2010), we analyse discourse 
through the notion of narratives (Roe 1991) that offer ways to discipline the complexity of the world by 
simplifying this complexity into plausible stories. Naess et al. (2015: 536) argue that 'narratives and 
evidence' provide a way to examine 'the histories and practices linked to shifting discourses, and how 
these shape and guide policy problems and courses of action. Institutions, meanwhile, refer to both 
formal and informal (sometimes called non-formal) rules that enable or constrain actors’ agency (Kern 
2011: 1120). Formal rules include policies, laws, regulations and standards, while informal rules refer to 
social norms, cultural practices, and values.  Naess et al. (2015: 536) describe interests, along with 
politics, as the 'core of classic political economy analysis', which emphasise 'the interactions of state 
and civil society, and different interest groups, social segments or classes'. This helps to understand 
essential political economy questions of who wins, who loses, how and why (Lasswell 1936). This 
connects the procedural (who participates and is consulted in energy policy decisions) and the 
distributional (who accesses finance, technology, electricity, how and on whose terms) such that 
achieving more pro-poor outcomes means attending to power and politics in the policy processes which 
create energy policy.  
The comparative analysis across Kenya and China makes for what seems, on the face of it, a surprising 
comparison. The two countries offer stark contrasts on multiple levels, such as size, population, the 
nature of the state and its relations to markets and democracy. They also look very different in relation 
to respective activities in relation to our empirical focus on solar PV. China’s engagement with solar PV 
is often characterised as largely focussed on industrial manufacturing, with a strong export market and, 
more recently, a focus on domestic, grid-connected solar, with strong, centralised state involvement 
throughout. Kenya’s solar PV market, on the other hand, is very much concentrated at the level of 
smaller applications, particularly SHSs and solar lanterns, together with an emerging market in solar 
mini-grids.  Kenya has very little in the way of manufacturing capabilities and is almost completely reliant 
on imports (often from China). The solar PV market and its applications for energy access amongst poor 
and marginalised households in Kenya also seems to be below the radar of central government led 
energy policy activities (Ockwell and Byrne 2016), which tend to focus more on large grid-connected 
energy projects, including recent interest in geothermal energy (Newell et al. 2014; Newell and Phillips 
2016).  
It is, however, these seeming differences characterising the two contexts that make for a useful 
comparison. As we see below, once we unpack the nature of different types of state and statehood in 
each context, a number of cross-cutting observations emerge, providing useful insights for broader 
thinking around the role of the state in energy transitions. The analysis challenges explicit and implicit 
assumptions of how transitions might be managed or controlled, demonstrating how, even in highly 
centralised states such as China, assumptions of state control are often illusory. This emphasises the 
importance of taking '[…] account of the historical dynamics of institutional change and the ongoing 
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negotiations between different groups […] to reveal how directions of change are negotiated through 
complex socio-political relations, involving multiple actors over time' (Scoones 2016: 307). More 
broadly, this emphasises the importance of more politically sophisticated accounts of how the kinds of 
transformations envisaged in contemporary international policy discourse have, have not and might in 
future be achieved in practice, in order that we might learn from these in thinking and acting. As 
Kuzemko et al. emphasise:  
By understanding governing for sustainable innovations as part of a more complex political 
whole this allows us to question which interactions between governance actors and actors in 
energy systems are delivering sustainable practice change and which constrain such change. 
Just as this is true for scholarly research so should this also be true for policymaking analysis…. 
it is also necessary to understand the historical energy landscape: who the important actor 
groups are, what interests they represent and their relationship to governance. 
Kuzemko et al. (2016: 101) 
In this paper we analyse our two historical political economy accounts of solar PV in Kenya and China 
from the perspective of three, broad analytic categories: (i) the organisation of the state; (ii) the political 




3. The Organisation of the State 
The first way in which we analyse the historical political economy of solar PV in China and Kenya is in 
relation to the organisation of the state. Different states are characterised by uneven power and 
resources that they can mobilise behind low carbon transformations, reflected in the ways in which they 
organise and are able to implement responses to energy policy challenges. It is possible to discern two 
broad types of organisational integration that characterise governance by different states. The first is 
the level of vertical governance integration. This refers to degrees of centralisation/de-centralisation, 
which have consequences for the form of energy politics, the types of transition that are possible and 
whether they can be 'steered' from above. It can, for example, take the form of centre-province 
relations, such as in China, or result from constitutional changes bringing about the devolution and 
delegation of authority and access to resources for counties, as has recently happened in Kenya. 
The second type of organisational characteristic is the level of horizontal governance integration. This 
refers to the organisation of bureaucracies and imbalances of power across government which has 
implications for interventions in the energy sector (for example the balance of power, authority and 
resources between ministries of energy and planning, as opposed to those dealing with environment 
and rural development) and how trade-offs around energy poverty, security and low carbon imperatives 
are resolved or not as a result. Because of the centrality of energy to growth (Ockwell 2008) ministries 
of energy and planning often wield more power and authority than departments and ministries 
responsible for the environmental, health, labour or other aspects of energy policy decision making. 
These are often reinforced by close and often revolving door relationships with energy utilities and 
providers with whom they have to negotiate to secure their buy-in and support for key state strategies. 
As Newell and Phillips (2016) show in the case of Kenya, for example, failure to ensure the buy-in of the 
energy ministry in early consultations led to the stalling of attempts to get a national climate action plan 
adopted for the country. For energy policy to be effectively implemented, there is a need for buy-in 
across all levels of governance, both horizontally and vertically. Likewise, policy alliances among central 
regulators without effective participation from key local, financial and market stakeholders will face 
challenges at the implementation stages of these top-down initiatives, as these non-state actors’ 
financial and technological resources are indispensable at project level.  
Whilst China and Kenya look very different in terms of their vertical and horizontal governance 
characteristics, our empirical data reveal tensions and complexities in both cases, with clear examples 
of competition over resources, authority, and who captures the benefits from particular policies and 
interventions. As can be seen in each case below, (mis)alignment of interests across the state, 
horizontally and vertically, is critical to the procedural and distributional effects of energy interventions. 
3.1. Organisation of the State in China  
China is assumed to have high levels of central state authority and capacity, implying highly integrated 
vertical governance characteristics. In some ways this assumption is corroborated by our analysis of the 
historical political economy of solar PV in China. The most obvious example is the way in which central 
government identified and supported the development of world leading industrial manufacturing 
capacities around solar PV, a largely export oriented industry with the dominant share of solar panels 
produced for overseas markets in Europe, particularly Germany and Spain (Zhang et al. 2014). But the 
central state also intervened when a range of factors later led to significant declines in orders (including 
the financial crisis, trade disputes in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) in 2008 over 
alleged Chinese 'dumping' of cheap PV panels and a fall in the price of polysilicon). This hit companies 
that had hoarded the material and led some Chinese solar manufacturers to the brink of collapse (Urban 
et al. 2016). China’s central government responded with a focus on opening up the domestic solar 
energy market as a rescue strategy for the manufacturing sector. Strong supportive measures, such as 
a favourable feed-in-tariff (FIT), government pilots, subsidy programmes and concessional bidding 
7 
projects were designed and implemented in a top-down manner to expand solar power generation 
capacity (Chen and Lees 2016). In addition, the development of solar energy was welcomed by many 
local governments and large energy utilities and manufacturing corporations as a new site for market 
opportunities and local economic development (Harrison and Kostka 2013; Shen (2017)).  
Multiple interests therefore aligned in promoting this 'strategically important' industry (State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 2008). This level of central backing meant that the rescue plan was 
fairly successful. By 2013 China had become the world's leading market for solar energy producers; by 
the end of 2015 it had reached a total installed capacity of more than 43.18 GW (National Energy 
Administration 2016). Over 15 GW was installed in 2015 alone, or more than a quarter of the total 
installation of solar capacity around the globe that year (IEA 2016).  
Similar examples of central state implementation of solar based energy interventions have been seen 
in the past in relation to energy access. In 1996, the central government introduced the 'Brightness 
Programme', which targeted off-grid communities across western China. From 2002 to 2007 the 
centrally planned Renewable Energy Development Project (REDP) sold more than 400,000 solar home 
systems benefiting two million individuals in north-western China (Sovacool 2012) including nomads in 
need of a portable, safe and sustainable energy supply.  
When a state as powerful as China intervenes decisively it can undoubtedly have a powerful effect. 
Nevertheless, a more detailed look at our empirical analysis of SEPAP in China paints a more complex 
picture, which challenges these assumptions around the extent of central state actors’ agency to 
effectively govern energy policy implementation. After President Xi Jinping’s December 2015 vow to 
eradicate poverty in China by 2020, SEPAP was elevated from pilot programme to national campaign 
and received the highest level of political endorsement. But a lack of horizontal governance integration 
led to competing state objectives around industrial strategy and development targets being held in 
tension, frustrating the ultimate outcomes of SEPAP in relation to the latter.  
As Geall et al. (forthcoming, 2017) show, recent poverty alleviation programmes in China are typically 
designed around two major criteria: the so-called 'precision' (精准 jingzhun) and 'industrial' (产业
chanye) requirements. The former emphasises government subsidies and assistance spent on the basis 
of precise and comprehensive data, so that specific households or villages can be targeted and helped. 
The latter, industrial, approach emphasises the improvement of industrial or productive capabilities of 
underdeveloped localities by developing creative and innovative industrial facilities, so that these 
households and villages can become self-sustaining in the long run.  
What emerged from SEPAP is an example of the important role of different types of state bureaucrats 
in determining the distributional outcomes of any policy. Its remit bridged energy regulation and 
development, the domains of two separate administrative departments. The aims of SEPAP initially 
seemed to align both their interests. Energy regulators were looking for a solution to high levels of 
curtailment in western provinces (with the highest levels of energy supply infrastructure) that had 
resulted from the rapid expansion of solar installations outpacing grid connections. Regulators were 
encouraging small-scale, distributed solar systems, where the energy produced can be consumed 
locally, but had been unable to meet their targets for distributed solar as investors favoured large-scale 
solar parks, as such capital-intensive investments provide more stable financial returns in the long run. 
SEPAP, therefore, received support from both poverty-alleviation and energy-focused officials, who 
found a compatible strategic vision that could benefit residents while helping to absorb overcapacity 
and increase distributed solar PV generation. 
In practice, however, SEPAP’s governance structure meant that energy regulators, rather than 
development officials, took the lead. Although SEPAP is co-governed by the National Energy 
Administration (NEA) and the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and 
8 
Development (CPAD), the decision-making power largely resides in the NEA, and in particular its 
Renewable Energy Department. This is because most of the implementation agencies (grid companies, 
solar corporations, and policy banks) are either directly or indirectly regulated by this department, while 
CPAD only play a supporting and monitoring role, with no administrative authority over the these 
agencies apart from the local poverty alleviation offices.  
This made a tangible difference in terms of the approach to the problem. The NEA’s priority interests 
were reallocating industrial capacity. Energy regulators typically have skills in supply-side management 
and experience in promoting industrial capacity, for solar panels and large solar plants for example, but 
they possess limited knowledge with regard to local contexts, or poverty and development issues, 
particularly at the grassroots, village level. As the regulator for industrial policies and industrial sector 
development that usually focus on supply-side expansion (such as the manufacturing and investment 
capacities for renewable energy facilities, or upgrading grid services), the Chinese national energy 
regulator is not experienced or capable of managing demand-side dynamics at the local level (such as 
the actual needs and difficulties of poor villages and households, local corruption, land disputes, 
insufficient local data, and transparent reporting systems), which would eventually determine the 
success of SEPAP as a development rather than industrial project.  
This emphasis on industrial development was evidenced in our ground truthing in Qinghai Province, 
where seasonally nomadic herders relied on off-grid, portable solar PV units, the provenance of which 
(whether civil-society projects or Chinese Government projects) were often difficult to distinguish from 
the perspective of the aid recipients. The only observation of a solar PV investment that did seem likely 
(and was, according to one local interview) to be linked to SEPAP, was a newly built 10 MW solar farm, 
which was not yet connected to the grid. One labourer at the plant told us it had been built by a Beijing 
based company and was intended to export electricity to neighbouring regions and provinces via new 
transmission lines, which could be seen cutting across the pasture (pasture, now enclosed, that was 
most likely traditional grazing pasture under certain seasonal conditions). Most significantly, she told us 
that the plant had been built under SEPAP and that it would not have been built otherwise, given the 
current unlikelihood of obtaining permission for large grid-connected plants due to on-going problems 
with curtailment. Another Beijing based expert at a Chinese Government think tank said that SEPAP had 
proven impossible to implement as initially intended, due to the high transaction costs and lack of 
additional funds. This may account for the type of workaround observed: a workaround driven by local 
industry looking for a way to clear a project that would otherwise be rejected due to concerns about 
curtailments; a workaround that clearly aligned with the interests and experiences of the energy 
regulators tasked with leading implementation of SEPAP and one that does not fit with the original aims 
of Central Government. When it gets to the level of the local state, the murky reality of village 
governance in China represents a serious challenge for the implementation and accountability of SEPAP.  
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, therefore, the China case reveals a 'vertically and horizontally 
fragmented bureaucracy'. Various interests intersect and interact to affect its likely outcomes. SEPAP 
originated from a leadership-level ambition and an alignment of bureaucratic interests between energy 
and poverty alleviation regulators. However, in terms of the governance structure of the programme, 
our policy content analysis and field investigation suggest that it is the energy regulators that have taken 
the lead in designing and promoting the policy process. It is their priority interests, such as reallocating 
industrial capacity, that are higher on the agenda. Furthermore, the intersection of these interests with 
local level power hierarchies have further served to ensure that the intended poverty eradication goals 
of SEPAP have been subverted to serve myriad local interests that are unlikely to be aligned with the 
more marginalised needs of, for example, nomadic herders. Hence, even in a centralised and well-
resourced state like China Central Government ambitions can be frustrated by, and get caught up in, 
local politics which seek to re-work interventions to their own advantage. 
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3.2. Organisation of the State in Kenya 
In Kenya we again see examples of how vertical and horizontal governance impacts upon the ways in 
which different interests vie for power and mediate the impacts of energy policy. On 27 August 2010 
President Mwai Kibaki promulgated the new Constitution of Kenya (ROK 2010), devolving a significant 
amount of power from the National Government to the 47 County Governments and splitting energy 
policy duties between the National and County Government levels. The National Government 
formulates energy policy, while energy planning is devolved to County level. Although the most recent 
draft energy policy provides some detail of the division of labour between National and County 
Government levels, there is evidence that the structure of energy governance is proving contentious. 
According to our research, there are some officials at the County level who see the Ministry of Energy 
and Petroleum (MEP)1  as not necessarily implementing the spirit of the Constitution. Rather than 
devolve powers to the counties, the MEP appears to see the Counties’ task as implementing national 
energy policy (Byrne and Mbeva 2017). Of course, it makes sense that some functions of energy policy 
be coordinated at the national level. But the enactment of the new Constitution appears to have created 
expectations that there will be more control over policy at the local level, with counties emerging as a 
major sub-national 'state' actor in Kenya. And, clearly, this has implications for resource flows, as much 
as it does for autonomy over energy developments. 
As well as these emerging national-county tensions, our interviewees also alluded to emerging tensions 
around governance practices within Counties. But, alongside these emerging signs of less integrated 
vertical governance, our analysis of the political economy of Kenyan solar PV also identified a significant 
example (the Institutional PV Systems Programme) that suggests that, when it is in its own interests do 
so, national state actors can bypass counties and other actors and act decisively to deliver energy 
services via off-grid solar PV applications. This seems to contradict strongly the received wisdom that is 
perpetuated by donors and many commentators, that the Kenyan PV market owes its success to a 
perceived absence of state intervention. It is also in stark contrast to the historical ambivalence and 
outright hostility towards solar PV within national energy policy that has tended to characterise national 
state actions and attitudes in relation to solar PV in recent decades (Ockwell and Byrne 2016). The 
Institutional PV Systems Programme was initiated in 2005 with 'huge' resources behind it (Hankins et 
al. 2009: 3). There was no indication of this programme given in the preceding, 2004 national energy 
policy, but it required a large amount of spending by the Kenyan Government and this has continued 
up to the present. As described in Ockwell and Byrne (2016), the Programme seems to have emerged 
as an ad hoc response to pressure on the Ministry of Energy (MOE) from the President’s Office soon 
after Mwai Kibaki was elected President in 2002. According to this account, Kibaki had promised the 
people in the Northeast Region (an area of arid and semi-arid land with little electricity grid 
infrastructure and sparsely populated, predominantly by pastoralists) that they would get electricity 
upon his election. When the MOE was told to find a way to fulfil this promise, it is said that the only 
quick solution would be to use off-grid PV systems. The idea was to electrify schools and then to move 
onto other community services facilities. Whilst there have been problems with the programme, it has 
indeed electrified a huge number of remote schools and other facilities. More than 4000 schools have 
been electrified with PV systems, according to the Ministry, at a cost of billions of Shillings (the precise 
figure is not known) (National Treasury 2010–2016). This commitment to electrification of rural schools 
is now continuing as part of new national state commitments to provide laptops to every primary school 
child (laptops which need electricity to charge the batteries) (Kiberenge 2013; Muindi 2013; Ombogo 
2013; Ongiri 2014). 
This seems to be an example of national level, central state actors exercising direct influence on the 
delivery of electrification, in contrast to the 'free market/market enabling' stance adopted in national 
energy policy and lauded by international donors and independent commentators. In order to follow 
                                                          
1 Previously Ministry of Energy (MOE). 
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the President’s order and find a way to fulfil his promise, the role of central state actors was seemingly 
easily reframed, from delivering 'electricity at a national scale, to be developed over long investment 
timescales' to 'electricity within a very specific context to be delivered quickly'. And the benefits for 
schools and other public buildings, used by many poor and marginalised people across the Northeast of 
Kenya, seem significant.2 
These illustrations from China and Kenya underscore the need to get inside the state and not view it as 
a monolithic and unitary actor. They also illustrate how the purpose and nature of interventions can 
change over time as personnel and their interests and expertise change. Networks, alliances and 
coalitions are required to carry policies and overcome incumbent resistance and barriers to action. This 
means adopting framings or developing issue-based coalitions that can carry a policy. The 
implementation of high level energy policy goals can meet barriers in the form of variegated interests, 
stratified, often simultaneously, across both vertical and horizontal levels of governance. Although, as 
we have seen in the case of the Institutional PV Systems Programme in Kenya and early Chinese central 
state engagement with creating industrial solar capacities, it is possible to identify examples where 
targeted central state ambitions, with high level support, can sometimes align with local needs in ways 
that make tangible differences. 
  
                                                          
2 Note: it is difficult to establish whether the Presidential push was the only reason for this programme. No State actor agreed 
to be interviewed about the Programme and so we only have comment from 'outsiders'. 
11 
4. The Political Nature of the State 
Beyond questions of the organisation of the state in bureaucratic terms along vertical and horizontal 
lines and the ways in which this affects energy pathways, the nature of the political system associated 
with the state is also vitally important in shaping procedural and distributional effects of energy 
interventions. We refer to different degrees of democracy and the scope for democratisation of 
decision-making, for example around identification of energy needs and priorities. This might be 
extended to decision-making about technology choices and R&D priorities and in relation to energy 
planning, electrification and pricing. Who participates, on whose terms and what difference does it 
make? Who gets consulted or not and perceptions of energy needs concretely affect energy policy 
decisions. We saw this above and will see it below in the case of China where there is a mismatch 
between the need for mobile rather than static technologies to reflect nomadic lifestyles. The seasonal 
movements mean there is a continued need for off-grid which is overlooked by central planners and 
local elites. How much scope is there for consultation, participation and contestation around policy and 
project priorities and in evaluations of their effects? How are contentious energy politics handled? The 
shift from the previous section is also towards a focus on styles and modes of governing: whether more 
top-down, negotiated, inclusive or elitist, why this matters, for whom and for what. Different 
approaches to managing politicisation reflect different ‘politics of control’. 
Literatures in development studies increasingly emphasise the importance of political settlements 
(Khan 2010) and political economy approaches to understanding power in particular contexts. Political 
economy analysis is utilised, for example, by donors seeking to understand the national political context 
into which development assistance is received (c.f. Routley and Hulme 2013). Political economy in these 
studies is typically understood as the identification of vested interests and systems of political incentives 
that frustrate governance reform programmes, limit the performance of public institutions, and 
disincentivise private investment (Desai 2011). From this perspective, Kenya’s failure in recent years to 
deliver on the promise of economic transformation has been attributed to a set of national political and 
socio-economic relationships characterised by 'competitive clientalism': fierce electoral competition 
enmeshed in systems of political patronage with strong ethnic dimensions (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 
2014; Khan 2010) where the political elite have been able to capture public institutions and resources 
to serve their private interests (Ng’ethe et al. 2004).  
Similar insights arise from analyses elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. In detailed empirical analysis of 
the Ghanaian cocoa bean industry, which they contrast with the case of the sugar industry in 
Mozambique, Whitfield and Buur (2014) propound a 'political survival of ruling elites' approach 
(Whitfield et al. 2015) to understanding the conditions under which industrial policy is successfully 
implemented or avoided, which we could usefully extend to think about energy policy. This approach: 
[…] emphasises that government’s policy choices and its ability to implement them, as well as 
its interactions with businesses, are shaped by incentives arising from the imperatives of ruling 
elites to remain in power and thus build and maintain political support. It argues that the state 
is never completely insulated, and no set of ruling elites is completely autonomous. Rather, 
what matters is how coalitional pressures shape the political costs of certain policies and the 
ability to implement them, given the resistance or support from factions and individuals within 
the ruling coalition and those financing it. 
Whitfield and Buur 2014: 27 
This kind of political economy analysis arguably provides an account that can engage with African 
politics and aspects of patronage that often cut across the artefacts of colonially imposed constitutional 
landscapes. Rooted in studies of African political economy, in this way Whitfield and colleagues are able 
to explain the way in which power is distributed in specific Sub-Saharan African contexts and how they 
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result in active incentives not to build technological capacities in specific sectors (such as energy). 
Through this, they are able to explain why reforms which serve collective interests are unlikely to 
happen pre-election (and in many cases, not at any time). As they go on to say: 
Whether (a faction of) ruling elites have mutual interests with a particular group of capitalists 
depends on whether they need those capitalists for their primary objective of political survival 
through building and maintaining their ruling coalition in order to remain in power. In 
democratic political systems that includes winning elections… In short, political survival means 
accommodating powerful groups, which can include financiers of political parties; firms or 
families who dominate key sectors in the economy; political elite factions with strength derived 
from their organisational capabilities; and lower levels whose support is needed to mobilise 
votes. 
Whitfield and Buur 2014: 129 
As Barnett (2014: 27) emphasises towards the end of a report that is otherwise fairly upbeat in 
expounding the value of political economy analysis in assisting practitioners and policy makers in better 
designing development interventions around energy sectors, […] it must be accepted that the over-
arching political environment in Africa may not be conducive to change'. 
Politics and power in many Sub-Saharan African countries differ in important ways from many Northern 
countries, rendering traditional (European/American produced) accounts of state politics redundant. 
So, for example, Michael Mann’s 'infrastructural power' thesis (Mann 1984), where states are able to 
extend their power by extending infrastructure (such as energy infrastructure), does not play out in the 
same way in many African contexts where state power is achieved and exercised more through social, 
cultural and family networks. This resembles a far more distributed and responsive (to local 
constituents) model of the state (but not in a Webarian sense (Weber 1922)) – whereby states are not 
accountable, but rather pulled in multiple different directions.3 However, it is important to note that, 
while this literature has focused attention on the specificities of African polities, it is somewhat 
constrained by national frames of analysis comprised of ruling political elites, state bureaucrats and 
domestic firms (Booth and Therkildsen 2012). 
Nevertheless, the politics of energy in specific contexts are revealing of which social and economic 
interests the state seeks to serve. Newell et al. (2014) demonstrate how Kenyan central government 
interest in low carbon energy is strongly focused on large, grid-connected infrastructure (for example, 
geothermal) and the needs of large, powerful industrial interests (which often, in Kenya and China, 
directly intersect with the interests of powerful politicians). Despite the success of the off-grid solar PV 
market in Kenya, and notwithstanding the anomaly of the Institutional PV Systems Programme 
mentioned above (which, as mentioned, is not covered by any official central state energy policy), 
comparatively little political attention is afforded to solar by the Kenyan Government, other than 
nascent, though rapidly increasing, interest in large, grid connected solar. Interest in electricity access 
is focused purely on ambitious grid expansion plans which rarely serve the needs of the rural or urban 
poor who often live within the extent of the grid but lack the resources to connect to it (or live in more 
marginal areas where grid connection is unlikely any time soon). It would seem then, that where state 
(understood as the Kenyan central government) 'control' (Stirling 2014) is exercised in relation to low 
carbon energy, the resulting changes have distributional implications that favour powerful industrial 
and political interests over and above the interests of poor and marginalised people. 
Questions have also arisen in Kenya around the extent to which new, county level decision making 
structures, introduced under the new constitution, will impact on the practice of energy governance, 
                                                          
3 Weber contrasted state bureaucracies that achieve legitimacy through their relation to legislative order with traditional forms 
of authority arising, for example, from kinship. 
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especially in regard to how citizens will be included (Johnson et al. 2016). Our interviews suggested that 
county energy plans were unlikely to focus on solar PV for energy access amongst the poorest people, 
many of them suggesting that the political salience of water would privilege a focus on this over energy 
access. Several interviewees suggested that bypassing state actors and working with non-state actors 
was the most effective way to privilege a focus on solar PV for energy access. An example was given of 
one county (that has already signed memoranda of understanding with several private companies) is 
designing financing mechanisms for PV, plans to develop its own regulations to foster renewable energy 
promotion, hopes to provide subsidies for low-income households to get solar, and is in discussions with 
a private investor to open a solar manufacturing facility. However, one private sector interviewee was 
cautious about involvement at the county level, citing heavy bureaucracy as an impediment to progress. 
Civil society actors and donors are also focussing attention on county energy planning. The World Bank, 
Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Netherlands Development Organisation 
(SNV) were all named in interviews, and one private sector interviewee mentioned that the UK's 
Department for International Development (DFID) and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers are also 
active at the county level. 
How all this will play out is, of course, open to question and debate. What will be the nature of relations, 
for example, between powerful donors, NGOs, international investors and capacity-constrained county 
administrations? Will local people actually get to participate or will county-level administrations 
replicate the notoriously corrupt practices seen for so long at the national level? To what extent will 
national energy policy begin to reflect the diversity of interests and needs of the counties rather than 
treat the nation as relatively homogeneous? If these dynamics play out unfavourably in the eyes of 
either county or national-level interests, what will be the effect on relations between the counties and 
the centre? There are many questions that arise around the new political economy of energy in Kenya, 
all of which underscore how the political nature of the state can have material impacts on who gains, 
who loses, whose interests are privileged, and when and how, in defining the nature and directions of 
energy transitions. 
We also find evidence in China of greater state support to those low carbon energy transitions that 
benefit commercial elites. Since the central government in China identified low carbon energy as a 
strategic sector for economic development, China has developed world leading capabilities in solar PV 
manufacture (as well as wind (Lewis 2013; Dai and Xue 2014; Lema and Lema 2013)). This astonishing 
'transformation' seems, however, on the face of it to be very much a story of export oriented, industrial 
development (Urban et al. 2016; Watson et al. 2015; Tyfield et al. 2015). There seems to be 
comparatively little literature about China’s development in the solar PV sector (or wind sector) that is 
directly oriented towards meeting the needs of poor or marginalised people, particularly those without 
access to the grid. As with Kenya, we observe, on the face of it, political economy dynamics playing out 
that favour large, industrial interests and the interests of those connected to the grid. 
This is not to disregard the recent emergence of SEPAP and related national government policies that 
seek to provide access to electricity for the claimed one per cent of the Chinese population currently 
lacking such access where a focus on energy access and poverty includes an explicit role for solar PV. 
But it is to recognise insights from other work in China (Tyfield et al. 2015; Urban et al. 2016) which 
suggest a number of pro-poor innovations (for example widespread uptake of indigenously designed 
solar water heaters) have emerged as a result of under the radar (non-state led) activities driven by 
markets, civil society and local government support. This contrasts, once again, something akin to 
Stirling’s (2014) 'control' (Chinese state led industrial development) with 'care'. Indeed, the state’s 
priorities and preferences are revealed by lack of interest in understanding impact. In the case of SEPAP, 
for example, there was no monitoring of whether benefits are accrued by poor people or village elites. 
Rather than an active notion of citizenship, people are viewed as passive consumers of state services 
such that they are not even 'users and choosers' of state services, let alone more active 'makers and 
shapers' of services and policies (Cornwall and Gaventa 2000). Local households have little information 
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or knowledge about these initiatives or their benefits. They are intended to be passive beneficiaries, 
with little negotiation power with project developers, officials, policy banks or grid companies.  
This is not to underestimate the fact that monitoring the distribution of the returns from SEPAP activities 
throughout a project cycle can be a challenging task. But in order to help meet the needs of the poor, it 
is necessary to understand better the energy needs, practices and experiences of those users – nomadic 
pastoralists in this particular case – that SEPAP and related policies have targeted. Most important here, 
perhaps, is understanding the continued seasonal movement of herders in the county, which mean that 
at least in this region of Qinghai, mobile, off-grid energy sources are as relevant and necessary for many 
local people as grid-connected electricity. As Geall et al. (forthcoming, 2017) show, 'some current 
approaches seem oriented towards the needs of industry and urban demand centres, rather than 
pastoral and rural communities'. 
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5. States in the Global Political Economy 
As well as looking at the organisation and political nature of the state and its particular relationship to 
energy, it is important to locate the role of the state in energy transitions in a global context which takes 
account of the power that a range of public and private transnational actors bring to bear on seemingly 
state-based energy pathways. As with the organisation and political nature of the state, such global 
political economy dynamics are material to shaping the procedural and distributional effects of energy 
interventions. Issues of policy autonomy and 'developmental space' are important here. The ways in 
which the scope governments have to independently chart and follow their own energy pathways are 
affected by levels of aid dependence, trade ties, their status as energy importers/exporters and how 
much scope they have to impose conditions on investors around employment, local content 
requirements and so on.  
There are different ways of conceptualising this. Newell and Phillips (2016) draw on the notion of 
'disciplinary neoliberalism', to understand how key development agencies and multilateral 
development banks constrain the policy autonomy and 'developmental space' of poorer countries over 
whom they exercise control through their lending practices (Gill 1995; Gallagher 2005). They suggest 
that this has occurred through first wave power sector reforms, and then a second wave of interventions 
aimed at trying to address energy poverty (produced in part by the first wave of reforms) and the 
challenge of de-carbonisation simultaneously, a dynamic usefully understood through the lens of 
'governance states' (Harrison 2004). Harrison uses the term to describe the World Bank’s attempts at, 
'reconciling a global political economy with its own designs and a specific set of challenges posed by the 
African region' (Harrison 2004: v). A high level of external influence, whereby the Bank is intimately 
involved in policy making, means that any clear distinction between the Bank and an autonomous state 
becomes difficult to discern. Through these negotiations, energy pathways are narrowed or opened up 
by the presence and interests of global actors and their interactions with state elites. This raises key 
questions about what instruments states have available to them to address the challenges of de-
carbonising their economies in a socially just manner, when many have ceded direct control over the 
energy sector (Tellam 2000). The disciplinary role of international finance institutions in shaping energy 
sector liberalisation in Kenya, therefore, requires an account that is transnational, with due attention 
to how capital and domestic political economies are intertwined (Newell and Phillips 2016). 
Interestingly, China’s investments in Africa, including Kenya, may increase Kenya’s policy autonomy over 
energy choices, albeit in ways which might undermine support for low-carbon options. Newell and 
Phillips (2016) show how China has emerged as a potential contender to the power of Western donors. 
The availability of Chinese financing could provide the basis of a broader shift in the geopolitical 
'landscape' that shapes both technology choice and the policy autonomy of the Kenyan state. 
Particularly in relation to the large hydropower regime that characterises Kenya’s energy infrastructure 
Chinese loans are thought to come with fewer 'strings attached', such as the KSh150 billion (around 
US$1.5 billion) High Grand Falls hydro project which was a focus of a trip to Nairobi in 2013 by senior 
officials from the Chinese Exim bank, so that Kenya can look to China for alternative sources of finance 
that are perceived to be faster, come with fewer conditions, and are more flexible. Specifically, China 
might be tempted to benefit from the reluctance of Western development banks to invest in fossil fuels 
and their insistence on procedural norms of consultation in the development of large hydropower 
projects, to secure new projects with the Kenyan state including around the discovery of oil in Turkana 
and coal in Kitui areas.  
Nevertheless, Shen and Power (2016) demonstrate how the politics of Chinese companies’ commercial 
interests in Africa are far more complicated than depictions of Chinese neo-colonialism (Economist 
2008). Rather, they relate to more complex inter and intra-state domestic political economy dynamics 
in China which create incentive structures for certain Chinese firms to pursue potential markets in Sub-
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Saharan Africa. This emphasises again the need for a more relational understanding of the state and the 
ways in which interests and outcomes are negotiated through a web of power dynamics that spans both 
state and non-state actors within broader politic economy contexts (Johnstone and Newell 2016). 
The political economies of Kenya and China are clearly organised in distinct ways in terms of the balance 
between state and market, public and private. This is reflected in different views of the private sector 
(managed on the state’s terms in the case of China) and a preference for market-led approaches in 
Kenya, pushed by donors and the World Bank. It is also worth looking at the hybrid nature of policy and 
commercial networks where business groups have uneven access to different parts of the state, and 
state and commercial interests coalesce around particular energy technologies and pathways, often in 
competition with one another. The reality of hybrid forms of power and the meshing of public and 
private actors, networks and finance calls into question the respective discursive constructions of the 
failures, inefficiencies and comparative advantages of states and markets alike in enabling energy 
transitions.  
Such dynamics are clearly illustrated in our historical political economy of solar home systems in Kenya. 
As alluded to above, this history is characterised by key early private sector actors, working with clear 
humanitarian agendas around rural electrification, working hard to construct a 'market failures' 
narrative around what policy interventions were required to support market development. This 
narrative was constructed in a way that fitted directly with the neo-liberal stance of donors, enabling 
solar niche actors to leverage significant donor funding for a range of interventions that more closely 
resemble traditional, public sector capacity building than any kind of neo-liberal market  creation. For 
example, Byrne shows how this market-failure narrative was built by key early players in the market, 
such as Mark Hankins who claimed '[t]he phenomenal growth of the Kenyan market has occurred almost 
entirely on a commercial basis' (Hankins 1990: 2). When the story was subsequently adopted by others, 
it tended to be simplified, and this simplified version has persisted up to the present where the market 
is usually described as 'unsubsidised' (Ondraczek 2013; Jacobson 2007).  
A more nuanced version of the development of the Kenyan PV market, based on alternative analyses 
(see Ockwell and Byrne 2016; Ockwell et al. 2017), would argue that donors helped the market evolve 
whilst the private sector later helped it grow. That is, donor-funded interventions enabled 
experimentation with new ideas and the creation of key capabilities (e.g. development of a PV 
curriculum for training technicians, early, publically available market research, production of manuals 
for PV users, vendors, and installers) all of which helped to establish the PV market in Kenya and later 
to increase sales of PV products. The market failure narrative worked as a political strategy. It persuaded 
a variety of donors to direct resources into the Kenyan PV market, and to do so over a long period that 
enabled the building of the Kenyan PV niche along several socio-technical dimensions. In so doing, the 
narrative and interventions became something of a virtuous circle. In other words, the attempts to fix 
'market failures' seemed to be working, making it easier to attract further funding to fix other 'market 
failures', and all the while providing the convenient fiction that the market was unsubsidised, thereby 
strengthening the veracity of the market-failure narrative (Byrne and Mbeva 2017). 
Whether or not these early PV actors in Kenya believed the narrative is not important. Instead, it 
married what these actors perceived or diagnosed to be market development needs together with the 
free-market ideology of actors such as the World Bank and several other major donors (for example 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), DFID). In other words, the early PV actors 
successfully developed an argument that was based around some version of the notion of market 
failures. First, they would see that there was a need to make an intervention in the Kenyan market. 
Then, by invoking a market-failure assessment of the problem, they would construct a justification for 
this intervention and present this in a project proposal to a donor. The justification exhorted the 
achievements of private sector actors in developing the Kenyan PV market, but then explaining that 
they were being hampered because of some unknowns, or technical difficulties, or capacity constraints, 
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etc. What was needed, therefore, was an intervention to help all private sector actors; an intervention 
to make it easier to conduct their market activities, i.e. to fix a market failure. This justification suited 
the donors because it appeared to be about supporting the development of free markets, rather than 
subsidising the purchase of SHSs or giving them for free. 
What we see, then, is the development of narratives by investors and donors towards the state which 
embody claims about what form a desirable 'business climate' would take in terms of security of 
investments, predictability and certainty around policies and time-frames. Despite critiques of the state, 
there is also intense competition among business actors to represent themselves as best able to deliver 
state energy goals, and there are fierce battles over state regulation and support to protect or 
undermine incumbent actors and nurture or squeeze niche actors. This includes the use of the state by 
private actors to close down competition from other niches. The Kenyan PV case provides an example 
of such efforts to close down competition within the emerging new PV niche. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the Kenyan Bureau of Standards was persuaded by actors in the PV industry that something 
needed to be done to introduce formal standards around the quality of solar home systems. A 
committee of existing Kenyan PV actors was convened to advise on this and agreed on the introduction 
of PV standards. But these standards were not widely adopted by technology suppliers and installers, 
leading to the eventual introduction of regulations. These introduced strict, legally enforceable rules 
around PV in Kenya and characterise a period of gradual closing down in the market around accepted 
norms of what represented good and bad practice. Through the connections developed between the 
recently-formed Kenya Renewable Energy Association (KEREA) (an association created and convened 
by key early actors in the solar PV niche), the Kenyan Bureau of Standards and other national energy 
policy actors during the standards and regulations setting processes, we can see the beginnings of 
advocacy efforts by the PV industry to influence energy policy in Kenya. These PV regulations could be 
seen as an attempt by the established actors to shut out new entrants and consolidate what they have 
already gained, making it more difficult for technicians, in particular, to gain access to the PV market. It 
may also have constrained, to some extent, experimentation with new ideas. 
It is also important to recognise that these interests are not clearly fixed. In Kenya, for example, we see 
the development of new coalitions of interests and lobbying on their behalf. The early neglect of PV or, 
as some would say, hostility toward the technology from national state actors in Kenya began to change 
in the period just before the development of an updated energy policy, a draft of which was published 
in 2004 (MOE 2004). It is difficult to know for certain, but it appears that some deeper interactions 
between PV actors and some state actors may have helped to create a somewhat more favourable and 
supportive view of PV from national state actors. These deeper interactions began with the above 
mentioned process of formulating PV standards, which began in April 1999. This process had involved 
some PV actors forming a committee with actors from the Kenya Bureau of Standards and spending a 
few years meeting regularly to discuss and deliberate on what PV standards would be appropriate for 
Kenya. In 2002, various PV actors developed an alternative national energy policy in parallel with the 
official policy making process led by the Ministry of Energy (Ockwell and Byrne 2016). Although there 
were occasionally tense interactions between actors involved in the two policy making processes, it 
would appear that the official policy did adopt some of the views of long-standing PV advocates. This is 
apparent in some sections of the policy, which refer to the PV market in terms similar to those used in 
the well-established story of the private-sector-led phenomenon and the market-failure narrative noted 
above. Other parts of the policy document also suggest a warmer attitude to PV compared with the 
earlier period, although it does not develop any specific strategies for PV beyond broadly supportive 
statements. In effect, it takes an 'enabling environment' view of the issue of PV promotion in line with 
the pervading free-market ideology. This somewhat more favourable view of PV continues into the 
latest version of the energy policy, one that has been developed to accommodate Kenya’s new 
constitution, and which splits energy policy duties between the national and county government levels 
(MEP 2015). The only policy introduced between the 2004 and 2015 energy policies that could be seen 
as active promotion of PV was the FIT (MOE 2012), although the solar FIT has been criticised by local 
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actors for being unattractive (see Newell et al. 2014) who report that the former Permanent Secretary 
of the Ministry of Energy is alleged to have lobbied to fix the PV FIT deliberately low so as to not attract 
investors). In general, the other strategies, as with the 2004 policy, are about the enabling environment 
(standards and regulations, certified training, information for consumers, etc.). This approach may suit 
the state in that it can claim to positively support PV so as to satisfy local PV actors and donors interested 
in clean energy development whilst not having to commit resources to active promotion of the 
technology. 
The Kenyan national state narrative around PV has evolved from being non-existent to adopting similar 
rhetoric to the narrative long-promoted by local PV actors (and, for that matter, many analysts beyond 
Kenya). This could be seen as a convenient narrative for Kenyan state actors, as correcting market 
failures (taking the narrative at face value) may not require extensive action or the commitment of 
significant resources. Instead, policies can be focussed on providing an enabling environment, 
something that is not well defined but could include standards setting, information sharing, certifying 
training courses, and other similarly low cost actions rather than testing new ideas – whether 
technological, financial, managerial, or others – in risky projects with multiple stakeholders. Moreover, 
these kinds of 'enabling environment' activities fall in line with the market-led ideology of donors who 
may, as a result, still be willing to provide the funds to put the activities into practice. Instead, the state 
can continue promoting large-scale low carbon energy projects such as those for geothermal electricity 
generation, whilst appearing to be supportive of the whole range of low carbon energies. Occasionally, 
the state has responded to lobbying from PV actors to provide specific supportive measures, such as 
introducing PV regulations and certifying training courses, but it is able to largely ignore the wishes of 
the PV sector and concentrate on meeting the needs of large industrial users (Newell et al. 2014). 
Looking back at the analysis of these two narratives of market failures and creating enabling 
environments, there is to some degree a symbiotic relationship between them. That is, eventually at 
least, both the state and PV actors seem to be getting what they want. Both sets of actors seem to be 
content with seeing the Kenyan PV niche as a private sector phenomenon and that fixing market failures 
will suffice to see it continue to grow. For PV actors, this means they can continue to seek support from 
donors to fix market failures while national state actors can continue to ignore PV, responding only 
occasionally with low-cost actions. This suggests that state actors have co-opted the long established 
PV narrative to serve its own interests. 
As well as lobbying, occupying available institutional spaces and building narratives around the 
desirability of preferred technologies and regulations, businesses also play a vital role in energy 
pathways as 'street level bureaucrats' (Lipsky 1980), the implementing agencies of state policy. State 
departments have to negotiate with businesses that are the subjects of regulations on the ground 
because their foot-dragging and non-compliance around reporting and enforcement can subvert the 
intention of government interventions. This is as true of VAT payments on the import of solar equipment 
that has been a key controversy in Kenya (Newell et al. 2014) as it is both for PV standards (as we have 
seen above given their effects on smaller producers) and attempts to control the quality of products in 
the market. 
States may lead, but they also rely on financial actors, public and private, to mobilise the necessary 
finance and help deliver goals and have to ensure their buy-in. It is clear, for example, from our political 
economy analysis of China, that central government endorsement is not enough to implement China’s 
SEPAP without proper financial incentives for solar companies and policy banks (Geall et al. 
forthcoming, 2017). Some poor counties may attract companies to implement SEPAP by offering the 
opportunity to develop large scale solar parks there. Yet facing severe curtailment, these opportunities 
may be less tempting, and Chinese policy banks are currently expected to finance the whole 5.16 GW 
of capacity by themselves, around 120 billion RMB according to current market prices. But these actors 
are likely to be cautious of providing upfront financing where poor households and villages can provide 
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little collateral for loans and the prospect of returns are uncertain. Widespread problems in rural areas 
with poor grid connections and delayed subsidy reimbursements may damage the viability of these 




We can see from the discussion above that the state plays and performs a range of, often 
simultaneously, supportive and disabling roles with respect to energy transitions and transformations. 
This reflects differences within and between states across a number of dimensions. We have noted 
throughout that what we expect of states with regard to energy transitions needs to be cognisant of the 
variety in state capacity, autonomy, resources and power to deliver on intended outcomes. Each of 
these are shared and contested by a multitude of public and private actors within and beyond the state. 
We explored both horizontal governance challenges across the state and between different ministries 
and bureaucracies competing for authority and resources associated with energy programmes and 
interventions, as well as vertical governance challenges the state faces shaped in the contexts of Kenya 
and China by devolution and contests between the central government and provinces respectively. We 
also saw how the political nature of the state, how much democratic space exists to participate in energy 
politics, to define policy priorities and contest projects and interventions, strongly affects distributional 
outcomes and which actors are able to capture the benefits of different energy pathways. Finally, we 
saw how the degree of autonomy and independence states have from 'landscape' actors such as donors 
and transnational corporations that play such a key role in financing energy technologies and 
infrastructures, impacts upon their ability to project and realise their preferred vision of energy 
transformation.  
In this sense we need to place the state in context. A relational focus invites exploration of state-society 
complexes and the relations of power which underpin them which are not confined within bounded 
territories and are often transnationally constituted (Johnstone and Newell 2016). It means not treating 
the state as an independent, atomised rational actor. Rather it requires an appreciation that the state 
is not neutral with respect to the actors and processes it is charged with regulating (Saurin 2001). This 
is perhaps especially true with regard to energy because of the nature of its relationship to growth, 
development ambitions and militarism and the potential for state elites to secure rents from energy 
resources in the ways described by work on resource curses (Ross 2012). Moreover, lack of access to 
energy and revenues from energy has the potential to generate popular social unrest.  Popular 
resistance to changes to fossil fuel subsidy regimes in many parts of the world (Ockwell et al. 2009; 
Lockwood 2015) illustrates clearly why state elites tread carefully when considering changes to the 
energy regime.  
We have seen how hybrid networks bring businesses and state actors together around particular visions 
of how the energy system should be organised, inviting a more nuanced understanding of where agency 
lies and how far it can be attributed without problems to a sprawling entity such as ‘the state’. This 
raises challenges and critiques of the illusions of control regarding state-led transitions that permeate a 
lot of academic writing and policy work on energy transitions. It points to the difference in Stirling’s 
terms between attempting to manage 'the Transition' and cultivating 'plural radical progress' (Stirling 
2014). It invites further reflection on how different ways of organising states, their different political 
complexions and levels of democracy, types of political economy and relationship to the energy base 
produce, facilitate and frustrate different types of energy pathway and, more challenging still, to 
establish which ones are most likely to simultaneously achieve the goals of tackling poverty and 
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